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Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, and Land Use: Comparing Three 
Federal Policies  
Margaret Walls and Anne Riddle 
Abstract 
Natural ecosystems provide a variety of benefits to society, known as ―ecosystem services.‖ 
Fundamental to the provision of ecosystem services in a region is its underlying biodiversity, i.e., the 
wealth and variety of plants, animals, and microorganisms. Because the benefits from ecosystem services 
and biodiversity are not valued in market exchanges, private landowners tend to undersupply them. We 
compare and contrast the different approaches taken to providing ecosystem services on private land in 
three federal programs—the Endangered Species Act, the Conservation Reserve Program, and Section 
404 of the Clean Water Act. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) places restrictions on land uses for 
private landowners if endangered species, or critical habitats for endangered species, are found on their 
properties. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) compensates farmers for removing valuable 
property from agricultural production to preserve wildlife habitat, water and soil quality, and other 
ecosystem values. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act prohibits destruction or damage to wetlands, unless 
individuals buy credits for equivalent wetlands created by third parties—so-called ―wetlands mitigation 
banks.‖ These three policies run the gamut from a command-and-control regulatory approach to a 
―payment for ecosystem services‖ option. We summarize the economics literature on key findings from 
these programs. 
 
Key Words:  biodiversity, critical habitat, conservation, green infrastructure, payment for ecosystem 
services, public goods, wetlands mitigation 






Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
The Important Role of Private Land in Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity ................. 2 
The Endangered Species Act.................................................................................................. 3 
The Conservation Reserve Program ..................................................................................... 5 
Wetlands Mitigation ............................................................................................................... 8 
Conservation Banks and “Green Infrastructure‖ ............................................................. 10 
Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................ 11 
References .............................................................................................................................. 14 Resources for the Future  Walls and Riddle 
 
1 
Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services, and Land Use: Comparing Three 
Federal Policies 
Margaret Walls and Anne Riddle 
Introduction 
Forests, grasslands, wetlands, and other natural areas can provide a range of benefits to 
society. In addition to private market values from activities such as grazing and timber 
production, these natural landscapes can have recreational value, offer flood protection, purify 
drinking water supplies, safeguard bird and wildlife habitat, sequester carbon, and regulate the 
climate. These public benefits from nature have come to be known as ―ecosystem services.‖  
Fundamental to the provision of ecosystem services in a region is its underlying biodiversity, i.e., 
the wealth and variety of plants, animals, and microorganisms. Biodiversity is necessary for the 
natural functioning of ecosystems. 
Private landowners tend to undersupply most ecosystem services and biodiversity since 
the values are not captured in market exchanges. The owner of a forested land parcel, for 
example, may reap the benefits of the timber that is harvested and sold but has no means of 
capturing the benefits the forest may provide in terms of carbon sequestration, endangered 
species habitat, clean water in nearby streams and rivers, and other environmental services of the 
land. Moreover, based on private market values, the landowner may choose to harvest the timber 
and sell the land for development rather than replant. Without a mechanism to capture the 
nonmarket values of the standing forest, ecosystem services will be underprovided.  
In the United States, most land use regulation is established locally through zoning codes, 
but the federal government has passed some important laws and regulations that affect land use 
and thus the ecosystem services that land provides. We describe here the workings of three 
programs and discuss findings in the economic literature analyzing these programs: (1) the 
Endangered Species Act—in particular, the provisions in that law that impact private land 
markets; (2) the Conservation Reserve Program and its voluntary mechanism for agricultural 
land retirement; and (3) Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which uses a market-based 
approach to protecting wetlands. We compare and contrast the different approaches taken to land 
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conservation in these three programs, which range from a command-and-control regulatory 
option to a more incentive-based mechanism that has features consistent with ―payment for 
ecosystem services.‖  
The Important Role of Private Land in Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity  
Approximately 60 percent of land in the United States is in private ownership. Virtually 
all of the cropland in the United States is privately owned, along with 62 percent of grassland, 
pasture, and range, and 63 percent of all forestland (Nickerson et al. 2011). According to one 
recent study, 95 percent of the plants and animals listed as endangered under the U.S. 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) have at least some habitat on private land (Hilty and 
Merenlender 2003). Other studies have found that a significant percentage of endangered species 
cluster in ―hot spots‖ on land that has valuable competing uses (Dopson et al. 1997). 
Private landowners are likely to focus on these competing uses in the absence of any 
government regulations and incentives to do otherwise, since they do not bear the full costs of 
the lost ecosystem services and biodiversity if the land is developed nor bear the full rewards if it 
is not. Likewise, even if the land remains in a natural state, managing it so as to protect the 
environmental services of the land is unlikely without a policy to induce that behavior. Some 
recent studies have developed economic-ecological models to illustrate these private market 
outcomes, though fully integrated models with micro-fundamentals on both the economic and 
ecological sides are rare. In one recent example, Eichner and Pethig (2006) specify a model in 
which individuals choose land use for economic activities and any residual land is left over to 
provide habitat for three species that form a food chain. The size of the habitat determines the 
diversity and abundance of species, and that biodiversity, in turn, leads to ecosystem services 
that provide benefits to humans. The authors show that in this setting, the free market outcome 
leads to zero habitat in the long run and all species are doomed, thus land restrictions are 
optimal. While highly stylized, this model provides a first step toward a fully integrated 
economic-ecological model. More research is needed along these lines to better understand the 
implications for species in a free market setting and the role for policy.1 
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Other studies connect econometric models with ecosystem outcomes, bringing in spatial 
aspects of land use. Spatial considerations are important; location and degree of contiguity of key 
wildlife habitat, for example, can be critical to the provision of biodiversity. In one recent study, 
Lewis et al. (2011) use an integrated econometric-ecological framework to simulate alternative 
incentive-based conservation policies and their effects on biodiversity. This study reveals the 
importance of habitat contiguity: a simple voluntary incentive-based policy in which the 
government offers a fixed payment per acre for all land converted from crop and pasture land to 
natural areas is shown to be inefficient, especially when the government has a small conservation 
budget, because of the inability to control the spatial patterns of land use. Adding rules about site 
selection—in particular restricting conservation to parcels that border other preserved parcels 
and focusing on larger parcels—can improve efficiency. A large literature exists that examines 
site selection and optimal targeting of conservation (see, for example, Ando et al. 1998; Newbold 
and Siikamäki 2009; and Newburn et al. 2004). 
The concept of ―payment for ecosystem services,‖ or ―payment for environmental 
services‖ (PES), has arisen in recent years as a means of internalizing the nonmarket 
environmental benefits of land. Wunder (2007) defines a PES scheme as a ―voluntary, 
conditional agreement between at least one ‗seller‘ and one ‗buyer‘ over a well defined 
environmental service—or a land use presumed to produce that service.‖ The agreement is 
conditional in that payment should be made only if it can be verified that the environmental 
service is continually provided. Sellers are typically private landowners and buyers may be the 
government, conservation agencies or other nongovernmental organizations, or private 
individuals or firms. 
Despite the appeal of the PES approach in theory, few true payment schemes exist in 
practice. And in the United States, many land use policies veer far from the PES ideal. Strict 
regulatory options are prevalent. We begin below with a federal law that establishes land use 
restrictions rather than using the pricing system, the Endangered Species Act, and then discuss 
incentive-based policies that are closer to the PES principle.  
The Endangered Species Act  
 The purpose of the ESA is to protect and recover species of plants and animals that are 
under threat of extinction, along with the ecosystems upon which they depend. Signed into law 
in 1973, the ESA has several provisions that are designed to limit the actions of both government 
and private landowners whose properties provide critical habitat for listed species. Section 9 of 
the Act prohibits the ―taking‖ of endangered species, defined not only as killing, wounding, or Resources for the Future  Walls and Riddle 
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capturing an endangered animal but also as adversely modifying its habitat. So-called ―critical 
habitat‖ under the Act is defined in Section 3 as specific geographic areas that have physical or 
biological features that are essential to conservation of a listed species and that may require 
special protection or management. Section 10 allows the government to grant an ―incidental take 
permit‖ to authorize activities that would otherwise be prohibited under Section 9. This requires 
a landowner to develop a habitat conservation plan.2 
The taking and the critical habitat provisions of the Act have been particularly 
controversial and, by many accounts, have led to some counterproductive outcomes. Together 
they provide strong incentives for landowners to avoid having their land designated as critical 
habitat, and evidence suggests that some landowners have engaged in a number of preemptive 
practices in advance of critical habitat designation (Adler 2008; Innes et al. 1998). In North 
Carolina, some forest landowners in the 1990s preemptively harvested timber in order to reduce 
red-cockaded woodpecker habitat on their land (Lueck and Michael 2003); the woodpecker was 
(and remains) an endangered species. Similar actions have been alleged in the Pacific Northwest 
with respect to the northern spotted owl, a threatened species. Other evidence of preemption has 
shown up in econometric analysis of data on land development: land in Arizona that was to be 
designated as critical habitat for the endangered cactus ferruginous pygmy owl was developed 
about a year earlier than similar land that was not so designated (List et al. 2006). And studies 
have documented that the mere listing of a species can discourage private landowners from 
participating in conservation efforts. Property owners within range of habitat of the endangered 
Preble‘s meadow jumping mouse, for example, revealed in surveys that they often would refuse 
to give biologists permission to conduct research on their land (Brook et al. 2003).  
Several studies have shown that critical habitat designation has a negative effect on 
property sales and property values. In an analysis of 13 years of data on building permits in 
California, one study found that a proposal of critical habitat in a municipality resulted in a 23.5 
percent decrease in the supply of housing permits in the short run and a 37 percent decrease in 
the long run (Zabel and Paterson 2006). Another study, using a calibrated spatial general 
equilibrium model, found spillover effects from critical habitat designation (Quigley and 
Swoboda 2007). Demand for housing outside of areas designated as critical habitat rises, leading 
to higher housing prices and land rents. This redistributes welfare among landowners and 
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consumers in the region. The model showed that the principal distributional impact is to reduce 
the welfare of housing consumers. The location of the critical habitat lands was also found to 
matter—the closer those lands are to city centers or other highly urbanized areas, the more 
valuable they are in development and the higher the costs of critical habitat designation.  
The impacts on land values and housing prices are to be expected; any regulation comes 
with a cost. The question is whether the ESA has generated benefits in excess of those costs. 
Most economists are doubtful. Since the law‘s enactment, nearly 2,000 species have been listed 
as endangered or threatened, but less than 50 have been removed from the list. As of July 2008, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers the Act in conjunction with the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, could identify only 21 species recoveries, as some of 
the delistings are due to data errors or extinctions (Adler 2008). No one has attributed any 
species recoveries directly to the regulation of habitats on private land. 
Many experts have pointed out that the essential flaw in the ESA is that it penalizes 
landowners, rather than rewards them, for having critical habitat (Polasky et al. 1997; Adler 
2008). Instead of receiving direct payments for the biodiversity resources on their land or 
enjoying a higher land value, they are penalized in reduced property values and the direct costs 
of maintaining the habitat. The Conservation Reserve Program, described in the next section, 
provides an alternative policy approach. 
The Conservation Reserve Program 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was passed into law in 1985 as part of the 
Food Security Act. It pays farmers to retire land from production, targeting highly erodible land, 
wetlands, streamside buffers, wildlife habitat, and other land that is determined to have 
ecosystem service benefits. Landowners can also receive compensation from the CRP for up to 
50 percent of the costs of approved conservation practices on their land. The CRP is by far the 
largest federal conservation program—at nearly $2 billion per year, it accounts for 
approximately one-third of all land conservation spending by the federal government (Walls et 
al. 2009). In 2009, 32 million acres of land were enrolled in the CRP, approximately 8 percent of 
all cropland.3 
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The program is voluntary. Farmers submit parcels for enrollment, along with a set of 
proposed conservation practices. The offer receives a score based on a government-calculated 
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI), which allots points for (i) perceived benefits to wildlife, 
including trees and habitat cover and whether the land is in a designated wildlife priority zone; 
(ii) water quality benefits, which are based on the expected impact on surface water and 
groundwater quality due to reduced erosion, runoff, and leaching; (iii) an erosion factor; (iv) an 
estimate of enduring benefits, which are points based on the likelihood that the land will remain 
out of crop production even after the CRP contract expires; (v) air quality benefits from reduced 
erosion; and (vi) costs—if the farmer is willing to accept less than the maximum rental rate 
established by the government for the parcel (which is based on soil productivity and average 
agricultural rents) and willing to forgo cost-sharing assistance from the government on its 
conservation expenditures, the project is assigned higher points in the EBI calculation. The first 
three components are weighted more heavily in the EBI than the last three, and of the last three, 
the cost factor receives the least weight. The EBI methodology was introduced in 1990; in prior 
years, the choice of parcels was based purely on soil erosion.  
Clearly the CRP works with private landowners in a very different way than the ESA. 
Instead of mandating and regulating private land activities that are harmful to ecosystems, the 
CRP provides financial rewards for beneficial practices. Moreover, the EBI approach attempts to 
tie selection of parcels to ecosystem service benefits achieved. Although the index approach is 
less than perfect, as several authors have pointed out, one estimate suggests its use has nearly 
doubled the annual benefits from the program compared with the pre-1990 system while leaving 
costs about the same (Feather et al. 1999). In contrast to the destructive preemptive practices 
documented in the ESA, farmers interested in the CRP program have been known to plant trees 
and wildlife cover in order to increase their EBI and the likelihood that their bids will be 
accepted. These activities, in turn, make it less likely that CRP lands will return to cropland after 
the end of the 15-year contract period and thus more likely that the ecosystem benefits are long-
lasting (Roberts and Lubowski 2007).  
The primary ecological benefits of the CRP are water quality improvements and 
increased wildlife habitat. A 1990 study by researchers at the USDA‘s Economic Research 
Service (ERS), which has conducted several analyses of the CRP over the years, estimated the 
net present value of improvements in surface water quality at $2 billion to $5 billion and habitat 
protection at $3 billion to $5 billion (Young and Osborn 1990). Overall, the program was 
estimated to have positive net benefits. A 1999 ERS study estimated the CRP‘s recreation 
benefits over the 1992–1999 period from water-based recreation, pheasant hunting, and general Resources for the Future  Walls and Riddle 
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wildlife viewing (Feather et al. 1999). That study concluded that the benefits totaled $555 
million per year. Among conservationists and wildlife advocates, the CRP is generally 
considered the single most important reason for the recovery of many North American waterfowl 
populations since the mid-1980s. In the ―duck factory‖ of the Prairie Pothole Region, which 
includes portions of Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Montana, and 
Wyoming, 4.7 million acres of CRP lands account for over 14 percent of the remaining native 
grasslands in the region, habitat that is essential for migratory waterfowl. Conservation 
organizations such as Ducks Unlimited have conducted studies identifying CRP lands as critical 
to the survival of some important species, including five common duck species, pheasants, and 
12 grassland songbird species (Ducks Unlimited n.d.).  
Despite the general consensus of positive net benefits from the CRP, several researchers 
have pointed out some shortcomings in the program. Because the rental payment is based on soil 
productivity and average agricultural rents but not directly tied to the EBI, the program has some 
built-in inefficiencies. Some farmers are overpaid while others may not even participate, even 
though their lands have high environmental values (Kirwan et al. 2005). Farmers can be overpaid 
when they have a low reservation rent but high EBI—a situation typical of highly erodible lands. 
Because the government caps rental payments, on the other hand, some farmers with high EBIs 
but high reservation rents may not be offered a high enough rental payment to participate.  
One suggested solution to this problem is constructing a payment scheme in which 
payments vary directly with the EBI, i.e., a kind of per-unit subsidy payment (Kirwan et al. 
2005). Other authors have suggested the use of a ―quota‖ auction, in which the government 
would limit the number of parcels it would accept that have high EBI scores but low agricultural 
reservation rents. Experimental evidence has shown that competition would arise in this setting, 
which would lower bids and thus program costs (Hellerstein 2010). Another suggestion is that 
landowners be allowed to ask for payments higher than those established by the government cap, 
in order to bring in parcels with high EBIs but high reservation rents (Hellerstein 2010).  
Some experts have proposed smaller changes to the existing system that would improve 
outcomes. Roberts and Lubowski (2007) show that existing participants in the CRP are more 
likely to keep their land in the program than are new entrants to sign up. These authors conclude 
that the program should thus offer different levels of payment depending on whether farmers are 
renewing or signing up for the first time. Other research has highlighted the importance of 
geographic location of CRP lands for ecosystem benefits, which in turn has led to proposals to 
include geographic location in the EBI (Hellerstein 2010). One suggestion is to include 
additional points for parcels located next to wildlife habitat or other preserved parcels in order to Resources for the Future  Walls and Riddle 
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prevent habitat fragmentation. Location is just one example of additional information to improve 
the targeting in the program. Other suggestions include better measures of the water quality 
benefits of the land, perhaps from water quality models, and general measures of ecosystem 
services (Yang et al. 2005). 
The CRP has many elements of a payment for ecosystems services program. Private 
landowners receive payments to maintain and protect their land for conservation and 
environmental purposes. However, the payments come from the government. A market for 
ecosystem services is not developed with exchanges between private agents leading to land 
protection. In our final section we discuss a program that has created such a market in the United 
States, albeit a nascent one: the wetlands mitigation banking program in the federal Clean Water 
Act. 
 Wetlands Mitigation 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act is one of the few federal statutes written explicitly 
with ecosystem services in mind. It prohibits the discharge of dredge or fill materials into any 
U.S. waters unless a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers authorizes such a discharge. 
For every authorized discharge, the permittee must avoid and minimize to the greatest extent 
practicable any adverse impacts to wetlands, streams and other aquatic resources. If impacts are 
unavoidable, compensatory mitigation is required—that is, replacement of the lost wetland and 
its associated functions. This has become known as the ―no net loss‖ of wetlands rule. Methods 
of compensatory mitigation include restoration, establishment, enhancement, and preservation of 
wetlands; the Army Corps of Engineers or an authorized state agency determines the appropriate 
form and amount of mitigation required for each project.4   In fiscal year 1999, approximately 
21,500 acres of permitted wetlands losses took place, offset by approximately 46,000 acres of 
compensatory mitigation (U.S. EPA 2001). Other studies have estimated annual average acreage 
in the 2000s at approximately these same levels (Kihslinger 2008). 
As an alternative to undertaking their own mitigation (or sometimes paying a ―fee in 
lieu‖), permittees are allowed to meet the mitigation requirements through purchases from a 
wetlands mitigation ―bank.‖ A mitigation bank is a wetland that has been restored, established, 
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enhanced, or preserved and then set aside to compensate for future conversions of wetlands for 
development activities. It may be created by a government agency, a corporation or individual, 
or a nonprofit organization. When the regulated entity approaches the mitigation bank for a 
purchase, the bank quantifies the wetland functions or acres restored or created in the transaction 
and calculates the value of the credits needed. The permittee purchases the appropriate number 
of credits from the bank, and after the transaction the bank owner becomes the party responsible 
for meeting requirements under the law concerning long-term management of the land, site 
protection, and defense of easements.  
The use of mitigation banks started in the early 1980s, but final federal guidance wasn‘t 
released until 1995. Since that time, they have become a mainstream way to meet the 
requirements of the Clean Water Act and have generated a market for wetlands conservation 
activities. A 2005 inventory by the Army Corps of Engineers documented a total of 450 
approved mitigation banks and an additional 198 banks in the proposal stage (Scarlett and Boyd 
2011). A 2003 estimate by the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) put annual spending on 
wetlands mitigation banking at $2.3 billion, interestingly topping federal spending on the CRP 
(ELI 2007). This same study estimated that more than 14,000 acres of wetlands are preserved 
annually through the banking program. ELI research also found that, out of a sample of 291 
banks in existence in 2005, 71 percent had been created by private entrepreneurs to serve 
multiple clients, suggesting at least the potential for wetlands credit sales to have some of the 
features of competitive markets. Of the remainder, 25 percent were private and served a single 
client and 4 percent were created by a public agency (Wilkinson and Thompson 2006). The 
number of private banks serving multiple customers increased greatly in the early 2000s as 
landowners and permittees became more familiar with the approach. 
The market-based nature of wetlands mitigation banks gives them great appeal. They 
provide a low-cost way for permittees to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act. 
Compared with on-site mitigation, or even mitigation off-site through individual one-on-one 
transactions with landowners, purchases from an established wetlands bank may be easier and 
have lower transactions costs. Moreover, the market in wetlands credits, by generating 
competition and bargaining in market exchanges, should help to bring down the costs of meeting 
the ―no net loss‖ requirements.  
Some research suggests, however, that the wetlands mitigation program has failed to live 
up to its promise (Turner et al. 2001; National Research Council 2001). In reviews of permit 
requirements, studies have found many unfinished projects. Moreover, permit conditions are not 
being met even in finished projects, and studies have found the mitigation area acreage to Resources for the Future  Walls and Riddle 
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sometimes be less than required in the permit and even less than the acreage lost to development. 
Wetlands functions are also not being replaced in many projects as required by the law; studies 
have found that only about 20 percent of sites met the ecological equivalent of the displaced 
wetland (using measures of vegetative cover and hydrological function). Some of these 
documented problems are due to poor monitoring and uneven administration of the program and 
not necessarily to the use of banks and credit trading, but studies have found that banks may 
create additional problems. In some locations, banks are not meeting the definition of wetlands 
but rather are just general conservation areas. And of the true wetlands in banks, many have been 
found to be in poor condition. A 2007 study of 45 wetlands banks, covering over 119,000 acres 
of land in Florida, concluded that full wetlands function had not been achieved in the banks even 
though such function was assumed when transferring credits (Reiss et al. 2007). The authors of 
that study offered several suggestions for improvement of the program, including allocating a 
higher percentage of credits for achieving success criteria and a lower percentage for completion 
of specific tasks.  
ELI research estimates the costs of wetlands mitigation at approximately $2.9 million per 
year, but it places fairly wide uncertainty bands on the estimates because of poor data on costs 
(ELI 2007). Whether benefits exceed these costs is unclear. Although the problems we 
mentioned above seem to suggest that the program is not meeting the ―no net loss‖ goal, it is 
clearly protecting wetlands over a no-policy baseline. Many studies have used stated and 
revealed preference methods to value wetlands and these studies have generally found positive 
values, though results vary greatly by location and wetland type (McConnell and Walls 2005). 
One meta-analysis in the early 2000s concluded that the value of wetlands averages just over 
$900 per acre but that the range of values across studies is quite high (Woodward and Wui 
2001). Wetlands that provide opportunities for bird-watching were found to have the highest 
value, at more than $1,200 per acre. The general conclusion the authors reached was that the 
benefits of wetlands are highly site-specific. This makes it difficult to conduct an overarching 
benefit–cost analysis of the wetlands mitigation banking program. 
Conservation Banks and “Green Infrastructure” 
The wetlands mitigation banking experience has led to the creation of ―conservation 
banks.‖ Conservation banks are natural lands set aside to protect rare habitat and support 
threatened and endangered species. Initiated in California in the mid-1990s, conservation banks 
are intended to operate in the same way as wetlands mitigation banks but for purposes of meeting 
habitat requirements under the ESA and potentially other regulations. Formal federal guidance Resources for the Future  Walls and Riddle 
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for the use of conservation banks under the ESA was established in 2003, making the Fish and 
Wildlife Service responsible for the administration of conservation-banking markets. These 
banks are still in their infancy, however, and little systematic information is available on them 
(Walls et al. 2009). It appears that only California has seen any significant use of conservation 
banks. For a time, observers expected the conservation banking idea to take off nationwide. This 
optimism arose from expectations over climate policy; a carbon cap-and-trade program or other 
climate legislation that gave value to carbon sequestration in forests and other natural areas 
might have created a significant demand for conservation and increased the use of conservation 
banks and a market-based system for land conservation more generally. This appears unlikely in 
the foreseeable future. 
In an era of strained public budgets, the conservation-banking idea and market-based 
approaches to conservation in general may have great appeal. Many communities are facing high 
costs to meet EPA‘s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) restrictions on nitrogen, phosphorous, 
and sediment pollutants in local streams and rivers. Municipal stormwater systems and combined 
sewer-stormwater systems are expected to need significant and costly upgrades to meet the 
requirements. So-called ―green infrastructure‖ alternatives focused on land conservation are 
receiving a great deal of attention as low-cost alternatives to the traditional ―gray infrastructure‖ 
approach. Similar green options for flood protection have been advocated as well. And many 
communities are realizing the recreational, aesthetic, and habitat co-benefits the natural lands 
would provide. The accompanying box (below) presents a brief summary of two prominent 
examples of green infrastructure programs. More research is needed on the costs and benefits of 
these green alternatives to traditional gray options, including their impact on land markets.5  
Concluding Remarks 
Land use is inextricably linked to the provision of ecosystem services and biodiversity. In 
the absence of government intervention, private landowners will undersupply these public goods. 
The question then is exactly how to intervene in land markets to best provide them. We 
discussed three federal government policies in the United States: the Endangered Species Act, 
the Conservation Reserve Program, and wetlands mitigation banking in the context of the Clean 
Water Act. These three programs run the gamut from a strict command-and-control approach to 
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a flexible market-based option, thus providing a laboratory to study what works. The programs 
also have very different effects on private landowners and on land conservation. 
 
Examples of Green Infrastructure
* 
New York City. New York City‘s investment in land conservation to protect drinking 
water supplies is one of the best-known examples of green infrastructure. The city 
has an unfiltered water supply, which comes from the Catskills/Delaware watershed 
upstream of the city. To avoid EPA filtration requirements in the early 1990s, the 
city adopted a novel approach: it began acquiring land and easements on private 
property in the watershed to protect land as natural areas. It now has over 70,000 
acres of land conserved at a cost of about $1.5 billion. The city estimates that if it 
had opted to build a filtration plant instead, it would have spent approximately $6 
billion  up  front  plus  an  additional  $250  million  per  year  on  operating  and 
maintenance costs. 
Milwaukee.  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin,  experienced  several  consecutive  floods  and 
storms  of  unexpected  severity  in  1997  and  1998,  causing  millions  of  dollars  of 
damages. This prompted the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD) to 
look at natural water management techniques to augment existing gray infrastructure. 
In 2002, the Greenseams program was created. Similarly to the Catskills/Delaware 
watershed  program  for  New  York  City,  the  MMSD  purchases  lands  or  obtains 
conservation  easements  in  targeted  areas  to  prevent  them  from  being  developed, 
using local stormwater fees and funds from the state. Over 2,100 acres of land have 
been protected using fee-purchases and easements. The MMSD estimates that the 
protected  areas  can  hold  an  estimated  1.3  billion  gallons  of  water,  at  a  present 
discounted  cost  of  approximately  $27.7  million.  By  contrast,  the  city‘s  main 
overflow prevention system, the Deep Tunnel system, currently holds 405 million 
gallons and cost about $3 billion. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*For more information on these two programs, see http://www.epa.gov/region2/water/nycshed/filtad.htm 
and http://v3.mmsd.com/greenseams.aspx. For more information on green infrastructure in general, see 
http://www.conservationfund.org/green_infrastructure  and 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/home.cfm?program_id=298.  
Research by economists suggests that the CRP has been the most successful, protecting 
ecosystem services on privately owned farmland and doing so in a relatively low-cost manner 
relative to alternative approaches. Questions remain about the program—whether an improved 
design could increase net benefits by lowering rental payments and enhancing the environmental 
benefits achieved—but the CRP remains one of the better-designed ecosystem services programs 
in the United States. By contrast, the ESA creates perverse incentives for private landowners—to 
preemptively reduce habitat to avoid the requirements of the law. And while wetlands mitigation 
banking is closer to a true market-based, payment for ecosystem services approach, it has been 
plagued with some problems related, at least in part, to the difficulties involved in defining and 
measuring the services provided by wetlands. This highlights an important issue for payment for Resources for the Future  Walls and Riddle 
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ecosystem services programs in general: it is often difficult to accurately measure, monitor, and 
enforce in such a way as to optimally provide these nonmarket goods and services.  
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